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Abstract
This article examines the impact of financialization on the income shares of the top 1%
from 1990 to 2010, through a panel analysis of 14 OECD countries. Drawing together
literatures stressing the dependence of income inequality on the structural bargaining
power of capital relative to labour, and of the dependence of accumulation on under-
lying institutionalized modes of state regulation, it shows that financialization has sig-
nificantly enhanced top income shares net of underlying controls. Whilst the income
shares of the top 1% appear responsive to variables typical of wider studies of per-
sonal income inequality, we emphasize distinctive mechanisms of top income
growth linked to the rising dominance of financial instruments and actors, facilitated
by a historically specific regulatory order. These conditions were key to the emer-
gence of a state of ‘asymmetric bargaining’ which disproportionately enhanced the
fortunes of the wealthy. Results thus emphasize the importance of class-biased
power resources and underlying regulatory structures, as determinants both of
income concentration and of the distribution of economic rewards beyond growth
capacity alone.
Key words: inequality, financialization, bargaining, social structures, regulation
JEL classification: O15 Income Distribution, N2 Financial Markets and Institutions, P48 Political
Economy
1. Introduction
Financialization has taken its place as a macro-stressor of income equality on a par with glo-
balization, technological change and economic development. Kuznet’s predictions of a secular
return to equality following a disruptive phase of dualist economic growth have not come to
pass (Alderson and Nielsen, 2002; Piketty, 2014), whilst globalization has merely hastened a
loosening of domestic constraints on firm activity, exposing labour to international wage
Socio-Economic Review, 2015, Vol. 13, No. 3, 417–447
doi: 10.1093/ser/mwv011
Advance Access Publication Date: 8 June 2015
© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press and the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics.
All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ser/article-abstract/13/3/417/1668494 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 06 M
ay 2020
competition and the threat of firm relocation (Choi, 2001; Harrison, 2005; O’ Farrell, 2010).
Amid profound shifts in the global economic order since the 1980s, it is clear that a limited few
have benefitted substantially, whilst many have seen their fortunes worsen—a situation
brought into sharp relief by the socialization of private debt in the post-crisis years, and the
damaging impact of austerity on low-income groups. Whilst some have stressed the depend-
ence of inequality on capital-augmenting technological growth and labour substitution
(Zuleta, 2012), others have pointed to institutional factors such as the strength of labour
movements, leftist political power and state welfare intensities (Beckfield, 2006, 2009;
Daudey and Garcia-Lenalosa, 2007). Backed by a strong and growing empirical knowledge
base, the rise of finance has also been identified as a stressor of both personal income inequal-
ity, and of the division of national income between capital and labour (Kus, 2012; Volscho
and Kelly, 2012; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013; Stockhammer, 2013).
The landscape of inequality research has changed drastically on foot of the public exposure
generated by Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014), wherein he outlines a model
of income inequality which positions wealth accumulation as an inherent, rather than aberrant
feature of capitalist history. Piketty links this accumulation to a fundamental divergence, where
slow growth relative to higher capital returns reduces the volume of investment needed to
increase personal wealth stocks. Whilst this ratio has remained skewed towards capital
returns throughout much of human history, it also appears likely to return to such a state if
capital taxation remains lax, and post-crisis growth remains slow. In some instances the recur-
rent rise in top incomes has been sharp. In the USA, the share of income accruing to the top 1%
of earners began to climb in the 1980s following a post-war slump, today bringing it to levels
not seen since the close of the First WorldWar (Volscho and Kelly, 2012, p. 679). The implica-
tions of Piketty’s framework for analyses of top incomes are profound. As the ratio of capital
gains to growth, and ratio of capital to labour income both appear responsive to specific policy
epochs, the social embeddedness and historical contingency of inequality is strongly asserted.
Furthermore, as Piketty links the imbalance of capital–labour income and recent executive
pay growth to the loosened bargaining constraints of top earners, it is useful to question
what precisely has underpinned this inequality at the meso-level. This article argues that
useful answers may be sought by focusing more clearly on asymmetries in power resources
and the bargaining power of capital relative to labour, allied to a unique regulatory order
which has underpinned top income growth since the 1980s. In doing so, it suggests that the
historical specificity of these factors, and the mechanisms underpinning wealth accumulation
since the 1990s, are usefully captured by the concept of financialization.
Financialization has been conceptualized in a variety of ways, such as the diversification of
firms into financial activities away from core ‘real economy’ pursuits (Krippner, 2011), the
growing use of securitization and tradable financial instruments as distributors of risk
(Movitz and Allvin, 2014), a realignment of corporate strategies in favour of profiteering
and cost saving (Thompson, 2003, 2013) and the use of credit to shore up consumption
under real wage stagnation (Guttman, 2008; Stockhammer, 2012; Kus, 2013a; ILO, 2013;
Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2013; van der Zwan, 2014). In terms of class structure, the era
of financialization has been characterized by the rise of what Foster andHolleman (2010) term
a ‘financial power elite’, deriving their wealth from financial profits, real estate and executive
compensation. Allied to such works on the general dynamics of finance-driven capitalism, a
growing body of research has brought renewed attention to the structural powerlessness of
labour relative to capital, and the institutionalization of liberal regulatory order since the
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1980s, factors strongly linked to greater accumulation at the top of the income distribution
(Diwan, 2001; Guscina, 2006; Kristal, 2010). The growing powerlessness of labour since
the birth of the era of financialization in the 1980s has been closely linked to the weakening
of the labour movement under the combined pressures of service sector growth, labour market
deregulation and the loosening of capital restraints as an engine of post-Fordist economic
growth (Jessop, 2001, 2013; Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003, Jayadev, 2007; Tabb, 2010). It
thus appears that the fortunes of the ‘winners’ of finance-driven capitalism have clear social,
political and policy underpinnings.
Evidence for financialization’s specific impact on inequality continues to grow. Whilst
financialization is shown to exert a strong depressive effect on wage shares (Stockhammer,
2013), Atkinson et al. (2010) are emphatic on the role of politics in determining top
income movement. This model of politically, rather than market determined income distribu-
tion accords with rent theory accounts of the financial sector’s increasing share of national
income. Consequently, researchers in this vein note howmarket equilibria are politically struc-
tured, and that income advantage above market rates is often secured through political ma-
nipulation of regulatory structures (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin, 2011, p. 541). Beyond
macro-level accounts of top income growth linked to growth and capital return rates, these
accounts lend strong credence to a power resources explanation of top income capture.
The rise of top income shares is of immediate practical concern. Whilst Stockhammer has
demonstrated the slowdown effect of financialization on accumulation and investment
(2004), Piketty’s illustration of the long-run dynamics of capital relative to national income
suggests that without political intervention to effect greater redistribution, inequality may
undermine the very basis of democratic legitimacy (2014). Tomaskovic-Devey et al. (2014)
estimate that financialization has had an overall negative impact on non-financial sector
output, where the resulting falloff in employment was borne by core labour, and where
senior corporate officers netted gains from compensation packages linked to capital
income. If the net effect of financialization is merely to induce greater economic exposure to
middle and low-income earners through debt incumbency and macroeconomic instability, an
understanding of the factors driving this disproportionate capture of reward by top earners is
therefore urgently needed.
This article examines the impact of financialization on top incomes, based on existing re-
search into the dynamics and drivers of income inequality. It draws on literatures identifying
the asymmetric balance of bargaining power between capital and labour as a key determinant
of the distribution of economic reward, and on research into the embeddedness of economic
growth within ‘social structures of accumulation’ comprising historically specific regulatory
orders, modes of economic governance and orientations to redistribution and social protec-
tion. With the exception of Dunhaput (2015) who focuses on a different set of financialization
and corporate governance related predictors, and Volscho and Kelly’s (2012) and Hicks’
(2014) studies of US top incomes, this study is among the first to examine in a panel
context, the impact of financialization and financial regulation on the 1%. Using panel
models of 14 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries
from 1990 to 2010, it argues that financialization influences top incomes through two prin-
cipal domains: (a) by altering the balance of bargaining power between capital and labour,
and (b) through state regulatory controls and redistributive mechanisms. Interpreting these
results within a regulation framework thus confronts certain limitations in Piketty’s treatment
of class relations and power asymmetries in his account of top income growth, whilst pointing
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towards specific policy domains through which institutional change may effect greater equal-
ity of outcome, beyond taxation alone.
2. Financialization and income inequality
Why focus on top incomes specifically? Studies of inequality to date have largely taken the
personal income distribution as their key outcome, and this has indeed fostered the construc-
tion of a useful body of theory which relates overall inequality to stressors such as globaliza-
tion, skill-biased wage premiums and collective bargaining capacity. Whilst others have begun
to open up the class politics of inequality by taking a closer look at the share of GDP accruing
to labour and capital (Kristal, 2010; Stockhammer, 2013; Flaherty and Ó Riain, 2015), they
tend to obscure the internal composition of the ‘capital’ grouping somewhat, by relying on
aggregate summaries of capital derived from national accounts. Isolating top earners from
the personal distribution is thus particularly warranted in light of their interdependence
with other components of the income distribution, where outcomes for one group may
affect the other (Atkinson, 2007). This is not merely a ‘functional’ relationship where the per-
sonal distribution responds mechanically to increases in upper fractiles, and the financializa-
tion literature discussed below underscores the uniqueness of mechanisms of top income
enhancement, as distinct from those which drive inequality across the distribution as a
whole. In the context of financialization, we thus find that substantial monetary gains tend
to centre on resource-endowed individuals at the top of the distribution. Conversely, research
on the impact of financial managerialism on working conditions reinforces this notion of
interdependence between income groupings, by suggesting that the remaining ‘resource-poor’
have suffered with greater debt burdens, and poorer working conditions (Tomaskovic-Devey
and Lin, 2011).
The income composition of the 1% is also distinct from that of the wider income distribu-
tion, with greater shares of rentier and entrepreneurial income (Alvaredo et al., 2013). The
diversity of their income streams aside from earned income alone thus points to their coher-
ence as a distinct ‘class’, a dimension often neglected in analytical work which has tended to
focus on the 1% as merely another indicator of income inequality, rather than a distinct social
group. There is a growing realization however that top earners form not only a particular stat-
istical fractile, but a distinct social group with unique mechanisms of reproduction (Roine and
Waldenstrom, 2010, p. 300). Using individual and firm-level data for the USA, Kim et al.
(2015) have shown how high pay diffused among CEOs through status competition, facili-
tated by social networks and peer group influence. This important individual mechanism op-
erated within a wider context of structural change such as the growing use of stock options for
compensation and the reduction of top marginal tax rates, both of which feature strongly in
the financialization literature considered below. The ‘functional interdependence’ of this frac-
tile grouping relative to the wider income distribution, and the mechanisms identified by Kim
et al. (2015) suggest that financialization may play a particular role in top income accumula-
tion, in a manner qualitatively and quantitatively different from that of other ranges of the
personal income distribution.
The political urgency of unpacking the drivers of this group is evident even within social
democracies with historically high levels of resilience to inequality such as Finland, which have
seen substantial increases in their personal income inequality (Gini), driven strongly by rising
top income shares (Jantti et al., 2010). There is also an important empirical issue concerning
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the omission of the 1% from studies of the personal income distribution. Given the substantial
variance of the income shares of the 1% which account for up to 30% of the total income
distribution, studies which exclude this (i.e. through underestimations of this groups asso-
ciated with survey data) may offer a misleading account of the drivers of income inequality
(Alvaredo et al., 2013). The following section thus reviews the current state of knowledge sur-
rounding the domains of financialization-related income redistribution. It attempts to draw
out mechanisms of association by linking various aspects of the general narrative of financia-
lization to the concentration of top incomes, whilst identifying relevant indicators.
2.1 Financialization and worker’s collective bargaining power
Close connections have been established between the rise of finance-driven capitalism and the
falling share of GDP accruing to workers as pay (Stockhammer, 2009, 2012, 2013). This im-
balance in the ‘factor’ distribution of income between capital and labour, which has risen con-
sistently across capitalist democracies since the 1980s (Kristal, 2010), has allegedly created a
disjuncture between economic performance and the spread of its financial rewards, which
have disproportionately accrued to high earners (Atkinson, 2009). The pace of this disjuncture
has been especially strong in the financial sector, where top compensation has surged relative
to other sectors (Kus, 2012). Specific connections between financialization and top income
movement may thus initially be established in two ways. A more direct route suggests that
profiteering in core financial sector activities disproportionately benefitted top earners by de-
linking pay from performance-related indicators, and through the provision of market-based
compensation packages linked to stock options (Thompson, 2013). A more abstract driver of
top income growthmay be identified in the growing literature on the relative bargaining power
of capital and labour, and its role in income redistribution. Although typically treated separ-
ately, in reality these are two sides of the same coin, insofar as both are implicated not only in
greater capture towards the top of the personal income curve, but in the consolidation of struc-
tural conditions reflecting a real shift in the capacity of institutions and actors to effect greater
equality of outcome.Whilst the former is well represented in the financialization literature, the
latter requires some contextualization in order to provide a clearer conceptual link to top
income movement.
The period from the late 1970s to 2008 saw substantial growth in capital’s share of GDP
across the OECD, with a corresponding fall in labour’s (Bentolia and Saint-Paul, 2003;
Harrison, 2005; Ellis and Smith, 2007; Decreuse and Maarek, 2008; Kristal, 2010). As global-
ization and structural adjustment in the post-war era opened new markets for consumer goods,
it also introduced wage competition as industrializing regions became attractive destinations for
corporations seeking to cut their labour costs (Harrison, 2005). The 1970s–1980 also saw an
increasing penetration of labour-saving technology into the labour process, public spending re-
trenchment, extensive labour market deregulation, and capital account liberalization under suc-
cessive neoliberal governments. The result was a weakening of traditional labour protections,
and the consolidation of policy regimes which would later underpin the growth of financial
sectors within many capitalist democracies (Rueda and Pontusson, 2000; Jayadev, 2007).
Under the influence of such stressors, capacities for collective solidarity were weakened as
deindustrialization across the developed North eroded traditional bulwarks of unionism.
In tandem with this shift in capital’s fortunes, how has financialization particularly
enabled the wealthiest to increase their income share on foot of labour’s growing structural
powerlessness? The hypothesized intermediary role of relative bargaining power is readily
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assimilable to the financialization literature. Boyer was among the first to explore the distri-
butional consequences of financialization, providing a theoretical link between the rise of fi-
nancial markets and shareholder power, and the dynamics of income distribution in the
post-Fordist era (Boyer, 2000). Accordingly, he identifies a ‘reactive wage labour nexus’
under finance-led growth, as a replacement for the comparatively stable social compacts of
Fordism (Boyer, 2000, p. 117). This dual weakening of labour’s capacity to extract its
stable factor share, coupled with a shift in bargaining power from labour to firm is consistent
with Thompson’s model of financialized corporate strategies ‘disconnected’ from human
capital concerns (Thompson, 2003, 2013). Under this ‘shareholder value’ regime, financial
incomes such as dividends, interest payouts, and capital gains have risen whilst financial
globalization has eroded workers share of economic rewards (Stockhammer, 2013).
Accordingly, CEO pay is now 262 times that of the average worker, with stock options
comprising a sizeable proportion of compensation packages (Kus, 2012, p. 485). The corre-
sponding rise in the financial sector’s share of profits, coupled with strong growth in rentier
incomes linked to ownership of financial assets, thus suggests a profound upward transfer
effect related to the rise of the financial sector (Epstein and Power, 2003; Volscho and
Kelly, 2012). Conversely for labour, as real wages remained stagnant during periods of
finance-driven growth, falling wage shares stifled consumption demand, leading to the emer-
gence in many developed countries of a debt-driven growth model where easy access to credit
fuelled domestic demand (Stockhammer, 2012). Capitalizing on the same process which
fuelled indebtedness, high earners leveraged greater returns by buying into securities, which
together generated rising instability in the financial system, whilst decreasing the resilience of
low-middle income earners to macroeconomic shocks (Guttman, 2008).
Empirical evidence linking financialization and inequality is substantial, and econometric
analyses have already demonstrated the potential for higher capital shares of GDP to increase
functional income inequality. When labour endowments are weak, higher capital shares
appear to drive personal income inequality higher, and when labour’s bargaining capacity
is stronger (i.e. when labour’s share of GDP increases), its effect on top quintile income is nega-
tive (Daudey and Garcia-Penalosa, 2007, p. 18). Similarly, Stockhammer (2013) found strong
evidence linking financialization-related variables to an erosion of worker’s share of GDP,
results mirrored in Kus’ (2012) analysis of its impact on post-tax Gini coefficients. On the
basis of these observed connections between the factor and functional income distributions,
it appears that the relative power resources of capital and labourmay be central to understand-
ing the rising capture of income by top earners. Furthermore, by omitting the mediating role of
bargaining power (driven by strong financial sector performance since the 1990s), and its con-
sequent erosion of worker’s wage bargaining capacity, an important mechanism in the facili-
tation of top income capture may have been overlooked.
2.2 Financialization as a social structure of accumulation
There is little doubt that the capital–labour dynamic associated with the era of neoliberal fi-
nancialization represents a distinct break from other historical epochs of capitalism (Kotz,
2003; Jessop, 2013). Locating the growth of top incomes within the realm of struggle
between capital and labour over economic rewards in the labour market represents but one
aspect of the politics of income distribution however. States and trans-national polities have
equally underpinned this bargaining asymmetry through the policy measures and distributive
mechanisms associated with deregulation and financial globalization. In this sense, regulation
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theory offers a useful framework for thinking through both the systemic underpinnings of in-
equality as captured by the concept of relative bargaining power, as well as the unique insti-
tutional and policy frameworks associated with the era of financialization. The assumption of
the centrality of regulation forms the basis of the ‘social structures of accumulation’ school
(SSA) which emphasizes the role of states in capital accumulation through their maintenance
of institutions of law and private property, systems of financial exchange and governance, and
labour markets (McDonough et al., 2010). The evolution of the various historical SSA’s is
typically treated sequentially. Following the demise of Atlantic Fordism with its emphasis
on a demand-sustaining compromise between capital and labour, SSA theorists identified a
successor in the form of a finance-based regime of accumulation, predicated on a disembed-
ding of capital from regulatory constraints and a commodification of the social wage through
cheap credit (Tabb, 2010).
Regulation thus provides a useful theoretical backdrop to the analysis of top income move-
ment, as it deals with financialization not only as a specific regulatory order, but as a logic of
capitalism inherently disposed towards rising inequality (van der Zwan, 2014, p. 106). While
deregulation was instituted partly to address post oil-crisis stagflation, it instead ushered a
shift from commercial to investment banking, and from loans to securities, disproportionately
benefitting wealthy investors (Guttman and Plihon, 2008). These shifts were underpinned by
policy measures including the US Monetary Control Act of 1980, later Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999 (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013) and the European Second
Banking Directive of 1989 (Guttman, 2008).
The structures of this regime of finance-driven accumulation arewell-articulated within the
financialization literature. The concept’s insistence on real change in institutional structure is
borne out by the disastrous impact of successive finance-driven crisis since the early 2000s,
and recognition of the pervasive hand of the state in sustaining financial markets through tax-
ation policy and regulation (van der Zwan, 2014). These new institutional and regulatory
orders played a key role in facilitating top income capture, and the surge in capital gains
and rentier income noted amongst industrialized countries throughout the 1990s was predi-
cated on a number of regulatory shifts such as capital account openness, which increased
capital mobility relative to labour since the 1990s, disproportionately raising capital
returns (Epstein and Power, 2003; Jayadev, 2007). Growth in profits attributable to financial
intermediation and interest income in the OECD was driven by anti-inflationary monetary
policies which raised real interest rates leading to greater capital gains, and deregulation of
the financial sector which enabled domestic innovation in financial instruments as well as
the incorporation of overseas markets for financial products (Epstein and Power, 2003,
pp. 234–235).
While many countries have seen cuts or stagnation in their capital gains and top income
taxation rates (GINI, 2011, p. 93), reliance on regressive redistribution measures such as in-
direct consumption tax often does little to alter the balance of income around the median
(Bermandi and Rueda, 2007). Piketty provides a compelling link between regulatory
regimes and the politics of wage bargaining, suggesting that taxation played a key role in de-
termining the capacity of top earners to leverage greater incomes. His analysis shows that top
incomes correlate weakly with productivity, responding instead to lower marginal tax rates
which encouraged executives to bid for higher compensation without the threat of losing
their increases to the state (Piketty, 2014, pp. 508–512). Furthermore, there is worrying evi-
dence that the redistributive capacity of some welfare states (the percentage reduction in Gini
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frommarket to net income) is falling even amongst social democracies such as Denmark which
has dropped from 50% in 1995, to 46% in 2010 (Solt, 2009). These observations suggest that
top earners have not only managed to capitalize on the opportunities offered by deregulation,
but to sidestep the absorption of their income by the redistributive mechanisms of the state.
Analyses have also shown how the impact of policy measures associated with financializa-
tion on top incomes was specifically channelled through domestic institutional structures,
through the capacity of the wealthy to affect policy. Volscho and Kelly (2012) found strong
evidence for the impact of institutional factors on the pre-tax income share of the top 1% in
the USA since the late 1940s. Their analysis noted an asymmetry in the power resources of
categorical income groups, where top income growth was affected first through the capacity
of organized labour to influence the market distribution of income, and second through the
capacity of states to redistribute through taxation policy and social transfers. It is therefore
difficult to attribute the growth of top incomes throughout this time to market forces alone
given the clear political history of the loosening of institutional constraints on financial innov-
ation. Drawing on a regulationist-informed view of financialization thus provides us not only
with a mechanism for linking regulatory politics to the material accumulation of specific inter-
est groups, but with a ready source of indicators such as the spread of the tax burden between
capital and labour, the capacity of the state to redistribute market income and the scope of
financial sector regulation.
3. Data and method
The following analysis uses fixed effects (within) ordinary least squares (OLS) regressionmodels
which control for cross-unit heterogeneity, on a strongly balanced panel of 14 OECD countries
from 1990 to 2010. This specification is appropriate in the presence of between-group inequal-
ities, and when subject-specific confounding cannot be ruled out (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal,
2012). Our analysis incorporates countries and variables which are likely to display cross-
sectional and temporal dependence, given the close economic inter-relationships likely to
exist between countries and regional polities under trade and financial globalization
(Christophers, 2012). Similarly, controls such as trade openness and economic growth are
likely to be correlated amongst units with close trading dependencies, who may experience
common patterns of exposure to economic shocks (i.e. the recent financial crisis). To account
for these issues, we use Driscoll–Kraay standard errors which are robust to heteroskedasticity,
autocorrelation and cross-sectional dependence (Hoechle, 2007, p. 285).
Mindful of issues related to non-stationarity, Appendix A reports panel unit root diagnostics,
and an additional set of tables comparing coefficients with models estimated in first differences is
available as an online supplement. Given the robustness of the FE estimator with comparatively
small values of t (Woolridge, 2013, p. 472), and potential issues in a minority of specifications
with missing values, the FE estimator is preferred. As a final robustness check, and to account
both for temporal lags in the effect of independent variables on top incomes and the potential
presence of endogenous predictors, we also include a full dynamic specification using the
Arellano-Bond Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). These models include a lagged de-
pendent variable, and all predictors are lagged by a period of one year. Across each of the
three domains detailed below, variables are selected for inclusion in the GMM specification
based on their substantive and statistical significance across previous models. Results in the
dynamic specification are largely consistent with the fixed effects estimator.
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The dependent variable is the share of income accruing to the top 1%, sourced from the
World Top Incomes Database (WTID) (Alveredo et al., 2014). These data offer the advantage
of using tax records to estimate top income shares, mitigating issues of underestimation often
associated with national surveys.1 As the individual country series’ adopt a common method-
ology, combining tax data-derived estimates of income with control totals for population and
income, their cross country comparability is considerably enhanced (Atkinson and Sogaard,
2013, p. 3). The various top incomes series’ also follow comparable ‘gross income’ concepts
which are incomes prior to allowable deductions such as interest, depreciation, pension and
charitable contributions. They typically include income items such as salaries, wages, self-
employment income, business and farm income, dividends, rents and interest; fractiles are
then estimated against a control total often derived from adjusted national accounts totals of
personal income. Capital gains are treated according to country tax code definitions. Income
jurisdictions, realized capital gains are assessed under a separate system of returns, whilst in
countries such as Australia and the UK, certain gains are considered under regular income tax.
The exclusion of realized capital gains is generally preferred, as realizations of capital
income are not typical ‘flow’ items but instead form a volatile component of income, with
strong periodic variations dependent on stock prices. The USA offers a good illustration of
this, as ‘. . . capital gains are typically very lumpy (they are realized once every few years),
so that ranking tax returns by income level including capital gains leads to artificially overesti-
mate very top income levels’ (Piketty and Saez, 2007, p. 195). Furthermore, including realized
capital gains risks erroneously assigning individuals to top fractiles who only occupy their
position at the time of their asset sale (Roine and Waldenstrom, 2010, p. 314). Most calcula-
tions include ‘rentier’ items such as dividends, interest, farm income and rents under their
gross income definition however, with final income concepts typically comprising labour,
capital (interest and dividends) and business income, less realized capital gains. The inclusion
of these capital items thus allows us to align the dependent variable with the narrative of
financialization-related mechanisms of inequality growth. These measurement issues are dis-
cussed in detail in the country chapters in Atkinson and Piketty (2007, 2010), and Appendix B
summarizes measurement procedures for those countries discussed in these volumes. Finally,
the reliability of pooling and the suitability of this series for modelling is further affirmed by
the observation that this income series closely tracks other measures of personal income in-
equality such as the Gini/Atkinson coefficients and income percentile ratios. These observa-
tions suggest that factors often found to influence the bottom and mid-range of the income
distribution may have similar effects at the top (Leigh, 2007), albeit through qualitatively
different mechanisms as detailed above.
Inclusion of cases is determined by the availability of complete series from theWTIDoffering
an added benefit, as the tax-derived income series of developed nations are typically more reli-
able than those of developing nations (Leigh, 2007, p. 621). Countries included in the following
analysis are Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the USA. Models are specified according to the two
principal domains which we suggest mediate the impact of financialization on top incomes.
1 Finland’s top income estimates are derived from the Income Distribution Survey for post-2003 figures.
Although the series relies on sample data, they are sourced from administrative registers of income,
taxes and benefits. This is likely to avoid problems of access or ‘opting out’ which hinder conventional
survey methodologies.
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As detailed above, the substantive and conceptual scope of these domains includes the bargain-
ing capacity of high earners relative to labour (power resources), and the embedding of finan-
cialization in regulatory structures (social structures of accumulation). As both domains are
embedded in bodies of formal theory with supporting econometric works, they offer not only
a source of explanatory narrative, but specific control variables as elaborated below.
3.1 Power resources and the capital–labour bargain
Operational definitions, sources and summary statistics for all variables are provided in Tables 1
and 2. The first set of models assesses the impact of financialization on top income shares, con-
trolling both for institutional protections associated with mitigating inequality, and the extent of
labour’s power resources. These specifications draw in particular on the work of Kus (2012)
who notes the positive impact of financialization on personal income inequality net of bargain-
ing controls such as unionization, trade openness and government spending. These parameters
also attempt to capture a particular asymmetry in power resources linked to bargaining capacity
identified by Piketty (2014), which has underpinned the ‘property space’ of top earners incen-
tives in financialized economies. Sectoralmodels of the impact of financialization on senior com-
pensation have confirmed this growing asymmetry, by noting strong top income growth linked
to financialization, coupled with a negative effect of unionization (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey
2013, p. 1308). Consistent with existing studies which have modelled the impact of financiali-
zation on the personal and factor distribution of income (Kus, 2012; Volscho and Kelly, 2012;
Stockhammer, 2013), we include trade union density from Visser’s ICTWSS database (2013),
government consumption as a percentage of GDP from the Penn World Table and the KOF
index of economic globalization compiled from data on trade flows, and trade restrictions
(Dreher, 2006). This index combines economic integration measures of actual flows (i.e.
foreign direct investment and income payments to foreign nationals), with measures of restric-
tions (i.e. import barriers and tariff rates). Eight measures are rescaled (0–100) to produce a
composite index of economic globalization (Dreher et al., 2008). Whilst this measure captures
a wide range of economic integration factors, we also include a direct measure of domestic trade
openness from the Penn World Table, calculated as the percentage of combined imports and
exports over GDP. To these are added unemployment, and female labour force participation
rates drawn from the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) statistics, as measures of cyclical eco-
nomic downturn (Volscho and Kelly, 2012), and changing labour market composition, respect-
ively. Economic growth performed weakly in all specifications and was therefore excluded,
although all coefficients are robust to its inclusion. Furthermore, as these models deal largely
with labour market-related variables, the effect of weak economic performance is likely to be
registered through unemployment.
Drawing on literatures which theorize the channelling of financialization through the
workplace through intensive, equity-oriented HR practices (Thompson, 2003; Cushen and
Thompson, 2013), we include a measure of the market capitalization of listed firms, in
order to capture the effect of firm participation and diversification into financial activities.
Given the suggested importance of credit in sustaining consumption under real wage stagna-
tion, and the issue of rising productivity capture by capital highlighted by the International
Labour Organization (2013), we include a measure of the volume of domestic credit issued
by banks to the private sector as an indicator of the growing importance of credit.
In order to capture the importance of finance relative to other economic sectors, we include
the gross operating surplus of Finance, Insurance and Real Estate as a percentage of total
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Table 1. Variable definitions and sources
Variable Operational definition Source
Top 1% income share Share of income accruing to top 1% of earners
based on taxation data.
WTID (see
Appendix B)
Government consumption National accounts government consumption as
% of Gross Domestic Product (sum of
collective consumption of government
including public good activities, health and
education).
Penn World
Table (Heston
et al., 2012)
Union density Net union membership as % of wage and salary
earners in employment.
Visser (2013)
Economic globalization Weighted percentage index comprising FDI
stocks, portfolio investment, trade and
income payments to foreign nationals.
Dreher (2006)
Trade openness Exports and imports as % share of current-price
Gross Domestic Product.
Penn World
Table (Heston
et al., 2012)
Unemployment Number of unemployed persons as % total
labour force (unemployed + those in paid or
self-employment).
OECD Database
Female labour force
participation
Females participating in labour force as % total
female population.
OECD Database
Market capitalization of listed
firms (% GDP)
Share price times number of shares outstanding
of exchange-listed domestic companies, as
% of GDP (Standard and Poor’s data).
World Bank
Databank
Private sector credit (% GDP) Loans, securities, trade credits provided to
private sector by financial corporations
(monetary authorities and deposit banks), as
% of GDP (IMF data).
World Bank
Databank
Finance, Insurance and Real
Estate Gross Operating
Surplus (% all sectors)
Gross Operating Surplus on financial sector
production activities as % of all sectors,
from National Accounts data.
OECD STAN
Labour’s share of Gross
National Income
Compensation of employees + self-employed
income (nominal compensation per
employee * self-employed persons) as % of
GDP.
AMECO
Financial globalization (log) Log of external assets and liabilities (sum of
portfolio investment including equity and
debt securities, foreign direct investment,
debt instruments, financial derivatives and
reserves) as % of GDP.
Lane and
Milesi-ferretti
(2007)
Economic growth (real GDP
% yearly change)
% Annual change in real GDP Penn World
Table (Heston
et al., 2012)
Capital taxation (% total
tax burden)
Levies on capital transfers or assets as % total
tax burden
AMECO
Continued
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sectoral gross operating surplus taken from the OECD’s Structural Analysis database. While
this is a preferable measure of financialization since it captures the growing contribution of
finance relative to other economic sectors (Krippner, 2011), its coverage ranges from 1990
to 2008. Finally, we include the share of Gross National Income accruing to workers as com-
pensation (labour’s share), as a core measure of the bargaining power of labour relative to
capital. Studies have shown the negative impact of labour’s share on personal income inequal-
ity (Gini), stressing the long-term importance of strong collective bargaining in sustaining
greater rewards for labour, and a more equitable distribution of income (Daudey and
Garcia-Penalosa, 2007; Stockhammer, 2013). These studies offer strong justification for in-
cluding labour’s share as an intermediary between the determination of an economy-wide
income pool, and the politics of its personal distribution (Atkinson, 2009).
3.2 Financial regulation and redistribution
The second set of models examines the impact of financial regulation and redistributive cap-
acity. These models address more pointedly the institutional structures underpinning asym-
metric bargaining capacity, by testing the extent to which taxation and redistribute capacity
Table 1. Continued
Variable Operational definition Source
Indirect taxation (% total tax
burden)
Taxes on goods and services as % total tax
burden
AMECO
Net income inequality (Gini) Standardized post-tax and transfer Gini income
inequality, imputed from Luxembourg
Income Study data
Solt (2009)
Extent of banking sector
liberalization
6-point scale of presence/absence coded
conditions: restrictions on opening of
foreign banks, government permission of
competition in domestic banking market,
restrictions on branching, limits on bank
activities (0 = fully repressed, 5 = fully
liberalized).
Abiad et al. (2008)
Extent of banking sector
supervision
7-point scale of presence–absence coded
conditions: country adoption of Basle
capital adequacy ratio, independence of
supervisory agency, presence of onsite
examinations and regulatory coverage of all
financial institutions (0 =Not Regulated,
6 = Highly Regulated).
Abiad et al. (2008)
Financial reform index Normalized sum of financial reform measures:
credit controls, pro-competition measures,
banking supervision, privatization,
international capital flows and security
markets (greater value = greater extent of
reform).
Abiad et al. (2008)
Top 0.1% income share Share of income accruing to top 0.1% of earners
based on taxation data.
WTID (see
Appendix B)
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may have augmented top income growth, by impacting the ability of top earners to realize
higher income levels (Piketty, 2014). According to Piketty, relaxed top income taxation and
wider financial regulation—theorized above as embedded in a specific historical regulatory
logic—played a key role in spurring inter-actor wage competition since the 1980s. These
models control for government consumption, union density and economic globalization, as
well as market capitalization as a base measure of domestic financialization. We also
include economic growth measured as the yearly percentage change in real GDP taken from
the Penn World Table. This variable controls for periods of economic volatility, whilst testing
for transfer effects linked to stronger economic performance (Kus, 2012; Volscho and Kelly,
2012). Models include financial globalization, measured as the log of external assets and li-
abilities over GDP (ILO, 2013; Stockhammer, 2013) in order to capture the dependence of
domestic financialized profitability on international expansion (Christophers, 2012). The
data on financial globalization are taken from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), and their
coverage extends from 1990 to 2004. In light of their limited coverage, inclusion of this
variable is limited to the first model in order to capture its unique effect as a component of
financialization, and to maximize panel coverage for subsequent models.
In order to assess whether top income growth has proceeded independent of domestic tax-
ation measures, and to assess the distributional consequences of different taxation streams, we
include the extent of capital and indirect taxation as a percentage of the total tax take, sourced
from the European Commission’s Annual Macro-Economic Database (AMECO). This set
of models also includes a measure of post-tax and transfer income inequality taken from
Solt (2009), in order to assess the relationship between underlying personal income inequality
Table 2. Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum Obs
Top 1% income share 8.88 2.74 4.37 18.33 280
Government consumption 6.80 1.10 4.08 9.46 280
Union density 37.46 23.31 7.6 83.9 280
Economic globalization 75.03 12.12 42.1 97.01 280
Trade openness 62.87 31.65 16.01 183.29 280
Unemployment 7.41 3.96 .47 24.17 280
Female labour force participation 52.76 8.05 33.2 64.2 280
Market capitalization of listed firms (% GDP) 81.72 56.16 10.19 317.03 280
Private sector credit (% GDP) 115.47 49.5 30.77 232.1 280
Finance, Insurance and Real Estate Gross Operating
Surplus (% all sectors)
31.42 7.05 16.59 47.36 247
Labour’s share of Gross National Income 58.68 5.01 43.82 70.46 280
Financial globalization (log) 5.41 0.70 4.16 7.54 210
Economic growth (real GDP % yearly change) 4.6 3.37 −10.24 17.6 280
Capital taxation (% total tax burden) 0.75 0.57 0.00 4.56 244
Indirect taxation (% total tax burden) 31.82 4.56 20.28 41.9 244
Net income inequality (Gini) 29.37 4.48 20.75 37.84 280
Extent of banking sector liberalization – – 1 3 224
Extent of banking sector supervision – – 0 3 224
Financial reform index 0.91 0.09 0.52 1 224
Top 0.1% income share 2.91 1.55 0.93 8.25 216
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rates, and concentrations within upper percentiles. Given the greater redistributive capacities
associated with more social democratic transfer systems, we should expect greater levels of
personal income inequality across the personal distribution to influence top percentile accu-
mulation (Atkinson et al., 2010, p. 706). To account for potential endogeneity, a re-specified
model using the income share of the top 0.1% is available as an online supplement, although
results in the GMM specification are similar in direction. The political basis of redistributive
capacity is further emphasized by research showing how social expenditure, capital taxation
rates and top income growth are often dependent on partisan incumbency, and their dispos-
ition to greater or lesser degrees of regulation and social transfer (Castles and Obinger, 2007;
Volscho and Kelly, 2012). Finally, to assess the effect of financial sector regulation, we include
measures of the extent of banking sector liberalization, the extent of banking sector supervi-
sion as well as a standardized index of financial sector reform, all taken from Abiad et al.
(2008). Full details of their operational definitions and direction of scoring are provided in
Table 2.
4. Results
4.1 Power resources and the capital–labour bargain
The labour market-bargaining context of inequality observed in existing studies thus appears
to hold in relation to top incomes, in light of consistency in the magnitude and direction of
controls across all specification (Table 3). Institutional protections such as government con-
sumption and unionization compress top income accumulation, whilst trade openness and
economic globalization appear to benefit top incomes, consistent with studies of the impact
of globalization on capital shares which link increasing capital power to technologically
driven productivity capture, innovation in financial instruments, capital account openness
and trade deregulation (Harrison, 2005; Jayadev, 2007). Unemployment, which captures
both cyclical economic downturns and the corresponding structural weakness of labour, dis-
plays positive association with top incomes across all specifications. This is unsurprising given
the comparative ease with which high earners are able to weather economic downturns
through reliance on alternative ‘unearned’ income streams linked to financial instruments,
an effect mirrored in later specifications which show positive effects linked to economic
growth (Volscho and Kelly, 2012). The accession of women to the labour force, a condition
associated with accession to low-security, low-skill occupations (Kus, 2012) is also unstable
across specifications and non-significant in the full bargaining model, suggesting these me-
chanisms may bear more relevance to the wider personal income distribution.
The progressive inclusion of different components of financialization allows us to examine
more clearly their effects, in tandem with underlying labour market conditions. The positive
effect of finance-related variables supports our assertion that financialization has driven top
income growth through bargaining asymmetry, both by stifling real incomes through demand-
sustaining debt servicing, and weakening bargaining capacity under decentralized industrial
relations. In the literature, the growth of debt markets plays an important role as an additional
channel for the enrichment of top earners through securitization, aided by innovation in finan-
cial instruments linked to increasing firm involvement in financial markets. The effects of
both market capitalization and domestic credit volume are weak relative to stressors
such as unemployment and economic globalization however, with the latter non-significant.
The weaker effect of debt is curious, considering that rising debt has been linked both to
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median income stagnation, and the substantial rise in publicly traded debt servicing agencies
which would suggest a stronger effect (Kus, 2013a). This finding likely reflects Kus’ analysis of
the moderating effects of debt, which shored up consumption andmoderated personal income
inequality (Kus, 2013b).
The mechanism of association between top incomes and market capitalization is perhaps
easier to establish, although its detected effect remains substantively small. As the ‘discon-
nected capitalism’ thesis is predicted on a divergence of corporate strategies towards share
price and dividends, the corresponding delinking of executive pay from underlying perfor-
mances indices likely underpins the strong growth of top managerial incomes relative to
median wage earning (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). High-earning hedge fundmanagers
now routinely earn over a billion dollars per year (the top 50 of whom are all male), whilst
CEO earnings including salary bonus and stock option, have been rising since 2010, reaching
Table 3. Power resources and the capital–labour bargain
Top 1% income share
1 2 3 4 5 GMM
Top 1%(t− 1) – – – – – 0.256***
(2.63)
Government consumption −0.530**
(−2.40)
−0.340
(−1.66)
−0.619**
(−2.79)
−0.809**
(−2.84)
−0.551**
(−2.84)
−0.100
(−1.14)
Unionization −0.059**
(−2.18)
−0.081**
(−2.59)
−0.047*
(−1.77)
−0.016
(−0.65)
−0.032
(−1.43)
−0.063**
(−2.02)
Economic Globalization 0.054***
(3.15)
0.010
(0.57)
0.051***
(2.94)
0.038
(1.06)
−0.020
(−0.51)
0.059
(1.60)
Trade openness 0.017**
(2.66)
0.009
(0.87)
0.016**
(2.58)
0.021***
(4.23)
0.006
(0.74)
−012
(−0.86)
Unemployment 0.087***
(3.09)
0.076***
(3.42)
0.093***
(2.97)
0.074**
(2.10)
0.059*
(1.91)
0.057*
(1.93)
Female labour force 0.092**
(2.76)
0.081**
(2.71)
0.078**
(2.60)
−0.014
(−0.21)
−0.001
(0.03)
–
Market capitalization – 0.011***
(6.34)
– – – –
Domestic credit volume – – 0.004
(1.54)
– – –
FIRE gross operating
surplus
– – – 0.185***
(3.24)
0.161***
(4.02)
0.116***
(3.53)
Labour’s share of GNI – – – – −0.207***
(−4.01)
−0.079***
(−3.77)
C 4.053**
(2.12)
7.149***
(3.27)
4.848**
(2.34)
5.338
(0.97)
21.673***
(2.87)
6.710**
(2.29)
P-value (F/chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs 272 270 267 241 241 218
Groups 14 14 14 14 14 14
R2 0.852 0.862 0.855 0.869 0.890 –
*10%; **5%; ***0.01%.
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an average of 10.5 million dollars in 2012 (Forbes, 2012). This is despite rising OECDmarket
income inequality and increases of up to 8 percentage points in relative income inequality in
countries such as Ireland since the onset of the financial crisis (OECD, 2014).
These discrete elements of the financialization narrative, and their embedding within
broader logics of economic action, may be better understood through a more fundamental
indicator—that of the relative importance of the financial sector. This variable forms a
crucial context to the shifting power resources of economic actors, and its importance is
evident in the consistent positive effect of FIRE sector operating surplus in our models. The
outpacing of FIRE sector profits relative to other economic sectors reflects a fundamental shift
in the generation of profits away from commodities and trade towards financial channels, a
process which saw widespread dependence of non-financial industries on financial income
streams as a profit subsidy (Krippner, 2005). Whilst the scale of this shift in the structure of
profit has long been recognized as a key indicator of the conceptual validity of financialization,
it also played a key role in reshaping power relations between interest groups within economic
sectors. More general works on the distributional consequences of financial sector expansion
particularly stress its effect on top-tier income capture, through the use of non-indexed per-
formance bonuses and stock options (de Serres et al., 2002). As reflected in sectoral-level work
on top compensation, the relative weight of financial to business receipts hastened a ‘decoup-
ling’ of surplus generation from production, enhancing executive compensation while exclud-
ing the wider workforce from wage-setting as resources were steadily reallocated away from
core production (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013, p. 1294). The consistency of our FIRE
variable thus generalizes this important structural precondition of bargaining asymmetry to
the wider pool of advanced democracies.
The distributional consequences of the growing weight of the FIRE sector in economic life
are further reflected in our findings concerning the effect of labour’s share. Consistent with
models of the relationship between the factor and personal income distribution, we find a
greater share of labour in Gross National Income to be associated with a reduction in top
income shares. Capital income growth has been explained with reference to the rise of
growth strategies incorporating capital account deregulation (Jayadev, 2007) which are typ-
ically investment-oriented. As a result, greater shares of capital in national income have been
associated with greater overall income inequality (Daudey and Garcia-Panalosa, 2007). The
above results suggest that this relationship holds net of underlying bargaining controls, and
of the sectoral importance of finance. Furthermore, it strongly affirms Atkinson’s (2009) sug-
gestion of giving greater attention to the intermediary effects of factor shares as a meaningful
moderator of the personal income distribution. The balance of labour’s share appears to
matter not only as a definitional measure of the setting of an economy-wide income pool as
per Atkinson, but also as a measure of the capacity of labour to effect greater income capture.
All specifications thus point towards a strong asymmetry in bargaining capacity reflected both
in the explanatory and conceptual literatures on finance-driven inequality.
4.2 Financial regulation and redistribution
The second set of models retains relevant controls from the power resources specification,
namely government consumption, unionization and economic globalization, in order to
include institutional power resources as a context for formal regulation. To these are added
economic growth, both as a test of transfer effects linked to stronger economic performance
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(Volscho and Kelly, 2012), and as a precondition of state redistributive capacity linked to
fiscal policy, which is likely to be responsive to underlying economic performance. As financial
market engagement provides a theoretical link between the power resources of top earners
vis-à-vis formal regulatory regimes, its consistency across both specifications net of underlying
controls is noteworthy. Similar to Stockhammer (2013), we find a particularly strong effect for
financial globalization net of other controls (Table 4). Given that the general weakening of
median income associated with globalization is a standard condition of bargaining models of
income distribution, it is unsurprising that this should also profoundly influence top incomes.
Table 4. Financial regulation and redistribution
Top 1% income share
1 2 3 4 GMM
Top 1%(t− 1) – – – – 0.278
(1.59)
Government consumption −0.099
(−0.78)
−0.009
(−0.07)
−0.517**
(−2.57)
−0.593**
(−2.79)
0.051
(0.27)
Unionization −0.058*
(−2.14)
−0.204***
(−7.26)
−0.045
(−1.20)
−0.047
(−1.20)
−0.150**
(−2.57)
Economic Globalization −0.042*
(−2.06)
0.031
(1.34)
−0.011
(−0.33)
−0.048
(−1.03)
–
Economic growth 0.059**
(2.31)
0.029
(1.24)
0.063
(1.46)
0.070
(1.59)
–
Market capitalization 0.008***
(4.09)
0.009***
(8.50)
0.011***
(6.99)
0.012***
(7.25)
0.005***
(2.64)
Log financial globalization (1990–2004) 1.528***
(4.47)
– – – –
Capital taxation – −0.179**
(−2.61)
– – −0.017
(−0.40)
Indirect taxation – −0.169***
(−4.37)
– – –
Post-tax personal income inequality – 0.238***
(3.27)
– – 0.191
(1.02)
Extent of banking sector liberalization
(90-05)
– – 0.546**
(2.28)
– –
Extent of banking supervision (90-05) – – 0.393**
(2.59)
– –
Financial reform index (90-05) – – – 0.229*
(2.10)
0.237**
(1.84)
C 5.431***
(3.05)
12.531***
(3.51)
12.950***
(3.87)
12.411***
(4.61)
1.878
(0.44)
P-value (F/chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs 200 222 214 200 158
Groups 14 12 14 14 12
R2 0.915 0.905 0.872 0.875 –
*10%; **5%; ***0.01%.
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This component of the globalization of finance may also be linked theoretically to the mechan-
ism elaborated for market capitalization, where the outward focus of firms and inter-trading of
financial instruments forms an integral component of the equity-oriented regime of corporate
governance. Instrument innovation also plays a central role in Piketty’s model of divergent eco-
nomic growth and capital returns as a driver of wealth concentration, where the diversity of
capital gains sources outstrips regulatory capacity. Together, both market capitalization and fi-
nancial globalization have been associated with growing capital mobility, and a diversification
of within-firm income streams, both of which appear to substantially augment the share of the
top 1%. In a broader sense, financial globalization should also capture the ‘leveraging’ effects of
global finance. This has consistently been identified as a factor which raised the pre-crisis
exposure of national polities to volatile financial markets, whilst also increasing the global
scale of profiteering, as securitization and deregulation both conspired to erode the domestic
limits of financial activity (Guttman, 2008; Tabb, 2010).
Specification two confirms something of the relationship between different components of
the overall income distribution identified in our original bargaining models. Both the factor
and personal distribution of income appear to track closely the shares of the top 1%, with
greater post-tax and transfer personal income inequality associated with higher shares of
income for the top 1%. Together, these measures construct a clearer overall picture of the
inter-relationship between different aspects of the income distribution and top income
capture, where the rise of the rich appears closely connected both to their volume of capital
share in GNI, and weaker state redistributive capacity (personal income inequality). Higher
capital taxes are predictably associated with lower top income shares, reflecting the likely de-
pendence of this cohort on interest-bearing income. The effect of higher capital taxation may
work either by conditioning of investor behaviour towards greater consumption, or by direct
redistribution through social transfers (Volscho and Kelly, 2012, p. 694). The negative direc-
tion of indirect taxation is curious, considering greater reliance on consumption taxes is typ-
ically associated with regressive effects on inequality, where poorer households often bear the
brunt of such increases. Although the distributive effect of various taxation streams depends
on underlying consumption habits, luxury goods comprise a small proportion of the overall
indirect taxation take, with the majority of consumption taxes levied on general goods
(Bermandi and Rueda, 2007). Although results point strongly towards the efficacy of
capital taxation and state distributive capacity as factors mitigating top income capture,
further investigation is clearly needed into the composition of the tax take in terms of the
spread and general cost of goods and services included.
Banking sector liberalization, banking sector supervision and financial reform are all asso-
ciated with growth in top income shares. The finding that all should contribute to top income
growth is explicable in terms of the content of the measures, and of the general logic of finan-
cial sector liberalization and supervision which accompanied financialization in advanced
democracies. First, our banking sector variable is likely capturing the emergent effects of firm-
level liberalization, whereby restrictions on foreign competition in the banking sector, and on
the range of permissible activities of banks was substantially relaxed over the timespan of our
models. This formed an important precondition of the financial crisis, whereby the commer-
cial banking sector sought to diversify its income streams in a competitive global market
through greater reliance on leveraged financial instruments (Ó Riain, 2014, p. 143). This ex-
pansion was both facilitated and underpinned by a specific logic of ‘light-touch’ regulation
which was embedded throughout the OECD through policy measures such as the repeal of
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the Glass-Steagall Act in the USA (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013), global implementation
of revisions to the Basel Accord (Guttman and Plihon, 2008) and the harmonization of fiscal
rules and monetary policy under the provisions of the European Monetary Union (conditions
captured broadly by our latter two variables). These institutional diversifications and policy
measures have been shown not only to increase the volume of exposure of the financial system
to high-yield capital markets, but also to drive welfare state retrenchment and weaken domes-
tic labour movements, thus driving income inequality higher (Beckfield, 2006, 2009). In the
post-crisis years it has also become clear that the pace of supervision and financial reformwere
insufficient to keep up with the growing complexity of financial instruments. This combin-
ation of banking liberalization and weak governance thus appears to have sustained a
potent mechanism for top income gains by substantially enhancing the scope of rentier
income streams, which form a key element in the income composition of top fractiles
(Alvaredo et al., 2013, p. 12).
Further empirical indication is thus given to the process of disembedding described by
Jessop (2013), where the institutional fixes of post-Fordist accumulation are predicted on pol-
itical measures geared towards loosening constraints on financial capital. These measures have
a clear political history through policies such as the Basel accord, which triggered widespread
use of securitization by financial institutions in an attempt to circumvent its capital adequacy
conditions (Guttman, 2008). Coupled with the recorded weakening in labour’s share (Kristal,
2010) and growth in personal income inequality particularly since the financial crisis (OECD,
2014), the above results underline a class-based bargaining model of accumulation, where the
political control of capital and its regulation have generated uneven advantage with a clear
class gradient (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2013). Whilst our coefficients on taxation, redis-
tributive capacity and financial globalization affirm the role of income-related social policy in
tandem with financialization, there is clearly a broader politics of distribution at work, as
revealed by the consistent direction and magnitude of institutional protections and stressors
in all specifications. The political basis of redistributive capacity is further emphasized by
research showing how social expenditure, capital taxation rates and top income growth are
often dependent on partisan incumbency, and their disposition to greater or lesser degrees
of regulation and social transfer (Castles and Obinger, 2007; Volscho and Kelly, 2012).
5. Conclusion
This analysis contributes two fundamental points to the financialization debate in particular,
and to Piketty’s thesis in general. First, given the general responsiveness of top incomes to
measures of power resources linked to financialization, our results suggest that wealth concen-
tration must be interpreted in terms of relative class-based and institutional power resources.
Second, these results offer a wider theoretical contribution, insofar as they reassert the neces-
sity of conceptualizing social change in terms of distinct regulatory regimes—financialization
being the most recent. While the preceding results must be cautiously interpreted owing to
sample limitations, they beg important questions concerning prognosis, as wider trends
suggest the era of financialization to be one of the worst in terms of its capacity to enhance
inequality. Our evidence shows that bargaining asymmetry is driven by a variety of factors
beyond fiscal policy alone, such as regulatory control, class-based power resources, financial
globalization and institutional weakening. Whilst the weight of financial sector profit and
productivity has continued its upward climb relative to other economic sectors, in many
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countries—including social democracies such as Denmark for example—it continues to out-
strip the real economy in terms of its contribution to productivity and growth. In light of this
complexity, serious questions must be asked about the ability of capital taxation measures
alone to effect redistribution in the absence of a broader reconfiguration of social relations
linked to the distribution of economic reward (Piketty, 2014).
In light of our findings that FIRE sector surplus constitutes a key predictor of top income
growth, and its noted role as a contributor to re-shaping the field of bargaining between
capital and labour, our findings must surely raise questions concerning the ability of a frag-
mented labour movement, particularly in liberal market economies, to effect meaningful
equality of outcome in an economy yet beholden to elite-dominated finance. This effect is
especially concerning since it captures a fundamental shift not only in the organization of
capitalist economies, but of the social relations under which the struggle for capitalism’s
rewards takes place. Recent history has shown that the shift towards finance has merely
offered a tentative basis for growth, volatility for labour, yet according to our results, a reck-
onable channel for the resource-endowed to augment their fortunes. This analysis further
underscores the importance of exploring income in terms of its factor and personal distribu-
tions, where inequality is driven both by greater capture of national product by capital rela-
tive to labour, and by a ‘hollowing out’ of protections associated with greater redistribution.
Questions of class-biased power resources rest at the heart of these inequalities, such as
control over the setting of fiscal and social policy, allocation of the burden of post-crisis aus-
terity and a deference on the part of stricken governments to financial markets in their
recovery strategies.
If we are to accept the prognosis following from Piketty’s ‘empirical proof’ of the central-
ity of inequality to a functioning capitalism, the consequences of continued top income
growth are likely to be dire. Harvey (2014) arrives at much the same conclusion in his diag-
nosis of the principal contradictions of capitalism, where he singles out the unsustainability
of compound growth in a system dependent on exponential returns. Worse still, the post-war
asset devaluations identified by Piketty as a principal shock to the fortunes of the wealthy
have apparently done little to alter the concentration of income in the crisis of our time.
Instead, the devaluation of 2008 estimated by the IMF at one year’s worth of global
output, offered but brief pause as property and interest-bearing assets remained largely in
the hands of the wealthy (Harvey, 2014, p. 234). It is therefore ironic that the recent financial
crisis has favourably exposed the ‘apparatus of exploitation’ embedded in capitalism’s latest
‘phase transition’, lending credence to public debate for redistributive measures such as
wealth taxation (Moreno, 2014, p. 265). Caution is required in generalizing these results
however. Whilst our choice of data was driven by the need to strike a balance between eli-
gible countries from the WTID with relevant financialization indicators, our conclusions are
thus limited primarily to ‘advanced capitalist democracies’ (Kristal, 2010). However, many
of our results are corroborated by other decomposed models which have examined advanced
countries (Stockhammer, 2013), where financialization has proven a greater boon to capital
shares than globalization, technological change and welfare state retrenchment.
Our results point towards the rising structural weakness of labour in the face of stressors
such as the globalization of capital, the erosion of redistributive measures such as collective
bargaining capacity, strong labour unions and financial regulation as key culprits in rising
wealth inequality. Financialization is implicated heavily in these dynamics, not only as a prin-
cipal agent in the shifting balance of power towards capital, but as a force in the erosion of
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regulatory control, as growth capacity in the developed world shifted from the real economy
towards disembedded financial activity. Prescriptively, these results suggest that greater shares
of state consumption, healthy labour movements, tighter regulation and stronger redistribu-
tive capacity are central to mitigating the effects of top income accumulation associated with
financialization. Further, we find strong evidence that this accumulation has been driven by
familiar components of the financialization narrative linked to a market-driven ‘disconnect’
between real growth performance and top compensation, and a side-lining of labour’s inter-
ests (Stockhammer, 2012; Thompson, 2013).
Although the preceding results identify a common stressor of equality in the form of financial
globalization, comparative research suggests that future work may benefit from considering
variation in the impact of financialization across different ‘worlds of capitalism’. Denmark’s
post-crisis use of collective private funds for distressed banks for example, contrasts starkly
with Ireland’s sector-wide deposit and liability guarantee scheme, illustrating the potential im-
portance of cross-regime difference between liberal and social democratic political economies
(Grossman and Woll, 2014). In the Irish case, the post-crisis response further entrenched in-
equalities between income groups by reducing the liabilities of investors, whilst redressing the
fiscal balance through awave of austerity policies, targeting public investment and welfare. This
is but one example of the potential nuances which may be overlooked by an analysis at this level
of abstraction. In terms of broader theory, our models suggest that a ‘social structures of accu-
mulation’ approach, albeit one augmented to focus on the impact of class-biased power re-
sources on inequality, is a productive line of inquiry. As evidence accumulates on the
importance of the distribution of bargaining power between capital and labour, it is important
that inequality research pays greater attention to how this bargaining power filters through regu-
latory orders, producing stronger concentrations of economic power and income capture.
Supplementary material
Supplementary material is available at SOCECO online.
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Appendix A
Table A1 reports panel unit root tests for all relevant interval variables included in the model. Unit
root tests were performed using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) sub-selection of Fisher-type
tests. The following tests assume an AR1 autoregressive process and are repeated using demeaned
variables to account for cross-unit heterogeneity. For all tests, H0: all panels contain unit roots; Ha:
at least one panel is stationary. The results indicate that although unit root processes appear in a
select number of variables, the diagnostics respond favourably to demeaning. These results lend
further credence to the utility of awithin-estimator, as the demeaned adjustment also subtracts cross-
section averages from individual series. A majority of variables—as well as the demeaned dependent
variable, government consumption and market capitalization—indicate absent or ambiguous evi-
dence of a unit root amongst all panels.
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Table A1. Unit root diagnostics
Panel unit root tests (AR1)
Variable
Inverse
chi-square
(Χ2)
Inverse
normal (Z)
Inverse
chi-square,
demeaned (Χ2)
Inverse normal,
demeaned (Z)
Top 1% income share 27.37 0.26 50.42* −1.11
Government consumption 74.54* −0.10 92.12*** −2.04*
Union density 154.42*** −2.69** 75.13* 0.56
Economic globalization 158.53*** −7.24*** 69.83 −1.57
Trade openness 47.61 1.21 57.95 1.1
Unemployment 106.30*** −4.79*** 125.03*** −4.53***
Female labour force
participation
61.56 2.13 70.33 −0.40
Market capitalization of listed
firms (% GDP)
67.28 −2.61** 69.77* −2.06*
Private sector credit (% GDP) 42.03 3.67 48.82 1.84
Finance, Insurance, and Real
Estate Gross Operating
Surplus (% all sectors)
62.80 1.13 81.97** 0.14
Labour’s share of Gross
National Income
136.72*** −4.02*** 139.87*** −4.57***
Financial globalization (log) 6.43 9.19 26.53 5.55
Economic growth (real GDP %
yearly change)
248.09*** −10.95*** 314.36*** −12.58***
Capital taxation (% total tax
burden)
131.82*** −1.93*** 97.53*** −3.17***
Indirect taxation (% total tax
burden)
126.02*** −4.37*** 134.90*** −4.45***
Net income inequality (Gini) 137.62*** −3.88*** 134.59*** −4.77***
Financial reform index 377.13*** −11.69*** 274.43*** −9.24***
Political globalization 379.98*** −13.21*** 197.00*** −6.11***
*P ≤ 0.05; **P≤ 0.01; ***P≤ 0.001.
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Appendix B
Table B1. Notes on the measurement of top incomes
Country Measure (income definition)
Column title from
WTID
Australia Tax unit is the individual, control total for population is that aged
15 and over, control total for income is national accounts total
of personal income with non-household items excluded
(charities, universities, social security contributions,
non-taxable payments). Australia uses ‘actual income’ concept
from 1958 (pre-eligible deductions). Some gains are included
under regular income tax, but others are excluded (as with UK)
since 1986 under separate capital gains system (Atkinson and
Leigh 2007a).
Top 1% income
share
Denmark Danish statistics offer a number of advantages such as a stable
long-term tax code, centralized data collection and detailed
tabulation. The taxable gross income concept excludes realized
capital gains, but includes transfers such as unemployment and
sickness benefit, and public pensions. Prior to 1980 where
subtle variation is introduced owing to the availability of
micro-data, the income concept included wage income and
transfers, stock and dividend gains, and net business income.
Tax units from 1970 are individuals aged 15 and over, and the
control totals are derived from the actual number of tax units
(Atkinson and Sogaard, 2013).
Top 1% income
share adults
Finland Data are sourced from the Income Distribution Surveys (IDS) and
Household Expenditure Surveys. Although the IDS is a
representative sample survey, it draws information on income,
taxes and benefits from administrative registers. These income
estimates include sources such as labour and entrepreneurial
income, capital income and received transfers. Realised capital
gains are taxable after 1993 reforms, however, state capital
income tax and property tax are subtracted under their income
definition. After 1975, jointly taxed persons were no longer
assessed as a single taxable unit. The authors note that rising
Gini income inequality has been driven strongly by increases in
top income shares since the 1990s (Jantti et al., 2010).
Top 1% income
share IDS
France Tabulations since 1915 list all individual income tax returns, and
the income concept is pre-tax, pre-deduction taxable income. A
key feature of the evolving composition of French top incomes
is a decline in the share of wage income in top fractiles, a rising
share of capital income (dividends, interest, rents). French top
incomes thus derive mainly from dividends, and large capital
owners are predominantly shareholders, not bondholders or
landlords (Piketty, 2007).
Top 1% income
share
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Country Measure (income definition)
Column title from
WTID
Ireland Income definition from 1970 is ‘total income’, which is net of
capital allowances, retirement annuities and interest paid. Tax
unit is the single adult or married couple with dependent
children, with control population total derived from census
years through interpolation. Control total for aggregate income
follows the USA, where aggregate personal sector income from
national accounts is adjusted for transfers and social insurance
contributions. By 2000, self-employed income comprised 69%
of the income of the top 1% group, whilst predominantly
unearned income accounts only for 4% of top income cases
(Nolan, 2007).
Top 1% income
share
Italy Calculations are performed on personal income tax data compiled
by the Italian tax administration, and the income concept is
gross income before deductions, and including income items
such as salaries, pension, self-employment income, dividends
and real estate. Controls population totals are derived from
census data, and the tax unit since 1976 is the individual.
Realized capital gains are mostly excluded, but the series some
gains from qualified equities. The control income denominator
is calculated from national accounts data on wages and salaries,
pensions, business income and non-labour income. The authors
note that evasion on wages, salaries and pensions at the top of
the distribution is low, as evasion rates tend to decrease with
true income (Alvaredo and Pisano, 2010).
Top 1% income
share
Japan Data are soured from income tax statistics published by the
Japanese tax administration, and the income concept is gross
income before individual tax liabilities, but after employers
payroll and corporate income tax. This includes all income
components reported in tax returns, such as salaries and wages,
business and farm income, self-employment income, dividends,
interest and rent, with realized capital gains excluded owing to
their volatility. The tax unit is the individual, and control totals
are calculated from counts of total adults, and from national
accounts figures of total personal income (Moriguchi and Saez,
2010).
Top 1% income
share
New Zealand The tax unit since 1953 is the individual, and the control is the
number of people aged 15 and over. The income total is pre-tax
gross income, and the control total is derived from adjusted
national accounts household income totals, including transfers.
Realized capital gains are excluded, whist dividends are covered
by the estimates. An increase of the marginal tax rate on
incomes over US$ 60 000 from 33–39% in 2000, led to
extensive realization of business earnings in 1999, whilst a fully
separate system of capital gains returns was established during
the same tax year (Atkinson and Leigh 2007b, p. 339).
Top 1% income
share adults
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Country Measure (income definition)
Column title from
WTID
Norway The calculation procedure follows closely that of Piketty for
France. Data on incomes are derived from tax register
micro-data files, supplemented with Income Distribution
Survey data. Taxation is generally joint, although separate
filing for two-earner couples has increased. Control totals for
population include adults aged 16 and over, and the control
income total relies on national accounts total household
income data. These include employment income, interest,
rents, dividends and transfers (Aaberge and Atkinson, 2010).
Top 1% income
share
Spain Estimates are compiled from personal income and wealth returns
to the Spanish fiscal administration, where the tax unit since
1988 is the individual. The income concept is gross income,
pre-deduction and incorporating all tax schedule items such as
salaries and pensions, self-employment income, business
income, dividends and interest. Although realized capital
gains are included in the tax base, a series excluding them is
provided and used for this study. Control population totals are
derived from census data of total adults, and control income
totals are derived from national accounts and GDP data.
Reinforcing the necessity of tax-based methodologies, Spanish
survey measures have shown a reduction in income inequality
and relative stability post-1980, whilst tax-based measures
show worsening throughout the 1990s (Alvaredo and Saez,
2010).
Top 1% income
share
Sweden Income data are derived from annual published income
distribution statistics, the income concept is all-source gross
income before taxes and transfers, less source interest
payments. Although the concept includes realized capital
gains, the data are structured in a way which allows them to be
subtracted from the series. The final income total includes
labour, capital and business income less realized capital gains.
Control totals for population and income are derived from the
adults population recorded by Statistics Sweden, and a
combination of national accounts data and Swedish tax
statistics, respectively.
Top 1% income
share
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Column title from
WTID
Switzerland Income definition is ‘Revenu net’ income before deductions, which
includes employment, business and capital income, excluding
realized capital gains. The Swiss tax unit is at family level
(married couple, or single person with dependents). Decennial
census’ are used to calculate control population totals through
interpolation, and the control income total is the total of tax
returned income with adjustment for non-returners. This total
income is defined as personal income including transfers, and
after-tax corporate profits after distribution of dividends.
Switzerland maintains a very low top marginal income tax rate
(10%); there is no federal inheritance or estate tax, and most
counties do not levy inheritance taxes between spouses, parents
or children. Thus the marginal tax rate on local and capital
income has been very low relative to OECD comparators.
Complete tax avoision is difficult however, as returns on wealth
invested are flat-taxed 35% at source. Whilst the use of flat-rate
allows for a level of secrecy around account ownership, it
allows for estimates of the proportion of non-Swiss filing
income tax returns (Dell et al., 2007).
Top 1% income
share
UK UK tax base figures do not correspond with definite income
definition, and thus omit most capital gains and losses (note
that there is a time effect here which lends some confidence to
the consistency of figures within the timeframe under
consideration within this study—whilst the effect of capital
gains and losses over time cannot be assumed uniform as
verified by the US case, incentives for tax avoidance fall within
changes to policy, which tend to be less frequent). Units for top
income estimates are individuals, and the control total for
income is the total from income tax statistics with an added
estimate of the income of units not covered. In 1997, the share
of investment income of the top 1% was approximately 12%
(Atkinson, 2007, p. 110).
Top 1% income
share adults
USA Tax unit is the married couple or single adult with dependents.
Calculations use a gross income definition which includes all
income items on tax returns before deduction (salaries and
wages, farm income, dividends, interest, rents). Realized capital
gains are not an annual flow of income and form a volatile
component of income with large variations dependent on stock
prices, thus the preferred series for comparability is the series
with excluded capital gains (Piketty and Saez, 2007, p. 144,
195). Piketty and Saez show that for the USA, although
measurement and taxation of capital gains are important, it is
not the primary driving force behind changing trends.
Top 1% income
share
Top incomes under finance-driven capitalism, 1990–2010 447
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ser/article-abstract/13/3/417/1668494 by M
aynooth U
niversity user on 06 M
ay 2020
